Some additional thoughts on “unintended” consequences

In my most recent blog post I, somewhat clumsily, implied that so-called “unintended” consequences are better referred to as “secondary” or “unmentioned” consequences.

It occurs to me that I need to explain a bit better what I mean. It is perhaps more accurate to say that that we economists, as outside observers, can virtually never know if a consequence of an action was “unintended” by the actor. Also, to say a consequence is “unintended” assumes away responsibility for bad decision making.

Indeed, I have been thinking about this lately and have come to the conclusion that there is an even deeper scientific reason to eject the “unintended” consequences construct/notion from our work as economists.

Namely, it seems to me it violates the value freedom (wertfreiheit) principle for which Mises (and most Austrians since Menger) advocated so tirelessly.

Does not claiming an outcome of an action is “unintended” imply we have full knowledge of the actor’s intent? As economists, and third party observers, how can we possibly know the actor’s intentions (beyond those he or she tells us) any more than we can know his or her motives?

Clearly there is a difference between motive and intent; nevertheless, these are both phenomena which can only be truly known by the actor. To use language which implies we know either motive or intent violates wertfreiheit.

Furthermore, from a purely logical stand point, it is simply incorrect for a third party (economist) to call an outcome of a purposeful action by another “unintended.”

If an outcome can be comprehended by reason and/or imagination after an action has occurred then that same outcome can also be comprehended by reason and/or imagination prior to the action. Whether or not the actor did, or did not, comprehend — prior to his action — the outcome his action obtained, is not an issue of concern to us as economists.  Indeed, we, as third party observers, can never know what the actor truly thought. Thus, to avoid violating wertfreiheit, we, as economists, must assume all outcomes can be (but might not be) comprehended by the actor prior to action. If all outcomes or consequences can be (but might not be) comprehended by the actor prior to action then we cannot logically say that any consequence is “unintended” since we simply do not know if it was intended or not.

Hence, for the economist, a consequence should just be a consequence.

Nevertheless, it is reasonable to call those consequences which fall beyond the bounds specifically circumscribed by the actor prior to his action as “secondary” or “unmentioned” etc. We cannot, however, as value free scientists, call them “unintended.”

It seems to me the only consequences which could conceivably be unanticipated prior to action are those brought about by pure chance or “acts of god” which are not really consequences at all. Rather, they are maters of coincidence and as such the economist has nothing of value to say about them.

Peace and Free Enterprise

Mark D Hughes

Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues (ISPI)

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